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STATE OF UTAH and 
JUDY E. BODILY, 
. Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-v-
JOSEPH EVAN BODILY, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 14386 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants, State of Utah, and Judy 
E. Bodily appeal from an order on an order to show cause holding 
that child support assigned to the State of Utah by a welfare 
recipient is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .'...-
The Appellants brought an Order to Show Cause against 
the Respondent for a judgment of back child support assigned to 
the State of Utah by a welfare recipient. As a defense thereto, 
the Respondent presented that said debt was included in a bank-
ruptcy petition and was therefore discharged at the completion of 
the bankruptcy proceedings. 
The lower court held that that child support assigned 
to the State was dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
order and memorandum decision which hold that assigned child 
support debts are dischargeable and seek that this case be 
remanded for a judgment of the entire amount claimed owed under 
the bankruptcy petition as well as the judgment granted by 
the court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Judy Bodily, divorced the defendant, 
Joseph E. Bodily, on July 13, 1973. The court ordered the 
defendant to pay $40.00 per month child support for two children 
from July, 1973 until January, 1974. In January, 1974 support 
was increased to $60.00 per month per child. 
In June, 1974 the defendant filed bankruptcy. The 
defendant listed the arrearage for child support as being a 
dischargeable debt but did not notify the State of Utah, as a 
creditor, of the petition for bankruptcy. The State was a valid 
creditor because Mrs. Bodily was on public assistance from July, 
1973 until the time of the order to show cause here involved. 
The defendant was discharged in bankruptcy on March 14, 1975. 
Between July, 1973 and January, 1975 the defendant had accumulated 
an arrearage of $2,595.00 for unpaid child support. The defendant 
only paid $45.00 in support to the Clerk of the Court during that 
time period. 
• i 
The State of Utah filed an Order to Show Cause against 
the defendant in June, 1975 to obtain judgment for the arrearages 
of $2,595.00. The defendant contends that the State is barred from 
e - e . : p. •'•••• • • • • i - . : r - - e r i t - '.he child suopor- arrearage whica 
accumulated beiween ,;.,,;... , :••;.- r u e : . . . . . - •. 
The State contends that child support is not dischargeable 
bai.erupie: •/ e e* 
. ^RChh-lh/h-
POINT 
A FATihiRS ubiir nlOR CHIhi SUPPORT IS 
NOT DISCHARGED IN BANKRUPTCY 
As "indicated by Judge Gould e: hi.::.-•• Memorandum 
Dec is .? on o • • :.eu u . 
the United States Constitution reserves to u ne Congress -i: the 
tin.te-' ~t >-*-.••-•• > ;-w :->•.-•••• j- establish lev-.-' on the subject of 
bankruptcy e Cuok. ^L ch^se laws w:; .,.,. :.,e.,cau.. i u,ei. uu-
for children ow^rl und-r State law oe court order: is not dischargeable 
"(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release 
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whetlv 
allowable in full or in part, except such as... 
(2) are 1iabi1ities for obtaining money or 
property by false pretenses or false represent.* 
tions, or for willful and malicious injuries 
to the person or property of another, for 
alimony due or to become du€^, or for maintenance 
or support of wife or child." (Emphasis added). 
Implementing thi s s tatutory provisioi 
Bankr-aye ev A c t which say 
' i\ a JL s c11CXL g e .1. i L ba nk r u y tcy s hail release 
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, 
whether allowable if fa1;- or in part.,. 
except such as are for alimony due or to 
become due, or for maintenance or support 
of wife or child." 
As early as 1901, the United States Supreme Court 
held in Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S.Ct. 735, 45 L.Ed, 
1009 (1901) that a claim for alimony due to a divorced wife is 
not a debt within the meaning of 11 U.S.C. 35, and on that 
ground as well as under the express provision of that section is 
not released by the bankrupt's discharge. Immediately following 
this decision, the Supreme Court entertained the question of child 
support. In Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 23 S.Ct. 757, 47 L.Ed. 
1084, the court held that a voluntary agreement to support children 
was non-dischargeable. 
Since the afore-mentioned cases, numerous decisions 
have been handed down from circuit courts, district courts, and 
bankruptcy courts implementing these holdings of the U. S. Supreme 
Court. Through statutes, rules, and court decisions the non-
dischargeability of support debts for children and wives has been 
upheld. 
Perhaps the case of Fernandes v. Pitta, 47 C.A. 2d 
248, 117 P.2d 728, a California state court case, presents the 
reason for these laws. In essence, the holding is the following 
though not a direct quote from the case: 
The rule that liability for support of wife 
or children, even though reduced to judgment is 
not provable in a bankruptcy proceeding, so as 
to release bankrupt from liability, is based on 
public policy to place obligations of support of 
wife or children on husband or parents so as to 
relieve society of those burdens. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also entertained this issue, 
though indirectly. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 43 6, 4 91 P.2d 231 
(1971) contains the following language and footnote. 
"In order to carry out the important 
responsibility of safeguarding the interests 
and welfare of children, it has always been 
deemed that the courts have broad equitable 
powers. To accept the plaintiff's contention 
that an adjudged arrearage is tantamount to a 
judgment in law, would in the long run tend 
to impair rather than to enhance the abilities 
of both the plaintiff and the court to accomplish 
the desired objective... For the foregoing reasons 
decrees and orders in divorce proceedings are 
of a different and higher character than judg-
ments in suits at law; and by their nature are 
better suited to the purpose of protecting the 
interests and welfare of children.2" 
*** 
[Footnote] 
"3 In addition to enforcement by the court's 
equitable powers, they are not dischargeable 
in Bankruptcy, 11 U.S.C.A. Sec. 35." 
Thus, it is clearly seen that the Utah Supreme. 
Court also recognizes the holdings presented in this argument. 
This gives support to the oft held position, that State courts 
must give credence to Federal decisions which pre-empt State law. 
Therefore, child support payments are non-dischargeable 
in Bankruptcy proceedings. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE PERSON TO RECEIVE THE SUPPORT 
PAYMENTS IS A STATE AGENCY UNDER THE PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM OR THE NATURAL PARENT 
MAKES NO DIFFERENCE AS TO DISCHARGEABILITY, 
The question now raised by this appeal is whether support 
assigned to the State of Utah retains its character as "child 
support" and thus is non-dischargeable as well. Referring once 
again to Judge Gould's Memorandum Decision (R-48) the statement 
is made that the intention of Congress was to make the debt to 
a public agency dischargeable. 
Appellants feel that the lower court did not recognize 
the important difference between support for children specifically 
exempted and other debts. It is Appellants position, that an 
assignment to receive said payments from the obligor does not 
work a difference on the nature of said payments but that they 
retain their character as support payments if they are received 
by the State. 
About the time of the filing of the Respondent's petition 
in bankruptcy, Congress enacted the Social Security Amendments 
of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 
1974) which spelled out in plain language the position of Congress 
on this issue. As a part of those amendments, 42 U.S.C. §460 (c) (5) 
provides that each applicant under the AFDC program (Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children), as a condition of eligibility therefore, 
"...assign to the State any rights to support 
from any other person such applicant may have 
(1) in his own behalf or in behalf of any other 
family member for whom the applicant is applying 
for or receiving aid, and (ii) which have accrued 
at the time such assignment is executed..." 
Further, 42 U.S.C. 456 (b) states: 
"[a] debt which is a child support obligation 
assigned to a State under [42 U.S.C. §602 (a)(26)] 
is not released by a discharge in bankruptcy under 
the Bankruptcy Act." (Emphasis added). 
The recent decision from the Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, In the Matter of Johnnie Williams, 
whose wife is Mytris Gene Williams, vs. Department of Social 
and Health Services, State of Washington, F.2d , decided 
January 20, 1976 (9th Circuit, 1976) makes the following holding 
regarding the application of 42 U.S.C. 456 (b) above: 
"Althoughthis amendment, effective July 1, 
197 5, should control future actions under state 
statutes seeking to collect accrued unpaid 
child support, it is not dispositive of this 
appeal. However, the decision we reach is in accord 
with and may properly take cognizance of this 
recent declaration of Congressional intent, Cf, 
Wetmore v, Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 76-77, 25 S.Ct. 
172, 175 (1904), For we hold that the recoupment 
debt created by RCW 74,20A, 010 et, seq, is a debt 
for maintenance or support exempt from discharge 
in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §35 (a)(7). 
(Emphasis added.) 
The above Washington case was, as here, filed and 
decided before the new amendments officially went into effect. 
But not only did the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals hold that amounts 
owed prior to the effective date of the above amendment owed to 
the Department of Social and Health Services were non-dischargeable, 
but the amendment is dispositive of all future situations. Here, 
in Utah, the District Bankruptcy Court made the same determination 
on February 14, 1975 in In re Riley. A copy of this decision is a 
part of the record between Pages R-37 and R-38. 
Appellants feel that Respondent purposely misled the 
state district court in its interpretation of In re Riley which this 
office prosecuted before Bruce Jenkins, Judge of the Bankruptcy 
Court. Therefore, an explanation is in order. 
In Riley, id., the husband and wife separated 
for approximately 21 months. During that time, Mr. Riley did 
not support his wife or child in any manner. There was no 
temporary support orders and no divorce action was instituted. 
The Rileys later reconciled, and filed a joint bankruptcy petition. 
Because there was no support order from a court of 
law, Judge Jenkins was required to apply Utah law in determining 
Mr. Riley's support obligation for the 21 month period. He 
turned to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7 1953 (as amended) which sets 
forth certain criteria in determining actual liability for support. 
Though the State feels U.C.A. §78-45-7 is for prospective payments 
only from the date of a hearing on the matter, Judge Jenkins applied 
those criteria for the 21 month period in question to see what 
Mr.Riley's child support obligation and liability was under Utah law. 
He held that of the $2,900.00 expended by the Utah State Department 
of Social Services, only $700.00 could be considered support for the 
wife and child as per his obligation. The difference between the 
$700.00 and $2,900.00 was solely an overexpenditure by the Department 
as per its own regulations having nothing to do with Mr. Riley's 
support obligation. 
For example, a grant for two people under the "welfare" 
program is $199.00. However, a court might order $75.00 per month 
child support and $50.00 per month wife support. Thus, the 
( 
difference between the $199.00 and the $125.00 as ordered by the 
the court is an overpayment not charged to an absent father. 
Therefore, Respondent's statement that Judge Jenkins 
penned figure of $700.00 means that some of the child support 
money is dischargeable and some isn't is a fallacious reading of 
the entire matter. Thus, the language of the order states as cited 
in Respondent's memorandum (R-32): 
"That it be ordered that the debt created 
by Kathleen G. Riley's receipt of AFDC 
assistance to the extent of $7 00.00 is a non-
dischargeable debt in Bankruptcy under Sec. 17 
(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act." 
Thus, the court's order did not hold, as Respondents 
claim, that all of the assistance given Mr. Riley's family was 
"child support", but that under Utah law only $700.00 of the total 
assistance was Mr. Riley's liability and obligation. That child 
support liability was termed "non-dischargeable." The criteria 
used to determine the amount owed, as alluded to previously 
is U.C.A. §78-45-7: 
"When determining the amount due for 
support the court shall consider all revelant 
factors including but not limited to: 
(1) the standard of living and situation of 
the parties; 
(2) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(3) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(4) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(5) the need of the obligee; 
(6) the age of the parties; 
(7) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others." 
The present case involves a court order under a divorce 
decree. The above seven criteria are not needed in determining 
the amount owed because of the court ordered support payments 
as indicated in the divorce decree (R.22). The entire amount claimed 
in Appellant's Order to Show Cause was a sum certain determined 
from the court order. Therefore, as per the Federal law, that 
entire amount is non-dischargeable. 
Not only does Federal law compel the above conclusion, 
but the State of Utah has enacted U.C.A. §55-15-32 confirming 
that belief. It states as follows: 
"Public assistance provided under this 
act shall not be assignable, at law or in 
equity, and none of the money paid or payable 
under this act shall be subject to execution, 
levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal 
process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy 
or insolvency law." (Emphasis added). 
Though Respondents attempt to belittle the enactment 
of this provision as "in contravention of Federal law" and thus 
void, Appellants point out that when state laws are in harmony 
with Federal laws the state laws should stand. In the present case, 
Federal statutes and decisions uphold the position expressed in 
U.C.A. §55-15-32. Therefore, this court should give credence to 
the intent, purpose, and meaning of it in determining this appeal. 
Further language of the 9th Circuit decision Williams, 
supra, points out the flaw in Respondent's position: 
"The bankrupt and the opinion of the Referee 
in Bankruptcy adopted by the district court argue 
essentially that the State of Washington has 
attempted to invest itself with the character and 
quality of the childrens1 relationship to the 
bankrupt by "statutory fiat," and that the true 
origin of the recoupment debt is the independant 
obligation of the Department to provide AFDC payments 
to all eligible individuals rather than the bank-
rupt's obligation to provide support... 
* * * 
W* disagree. A debt's underlying nature, rather 
than its form, is the~central concern in determining 
whether it is discharged. Cf. Pepper v. Litton, 
308 U.S. 295, 305-06, 60 S.Ct. 238, 244-45 (1939); 
Martin v. Rosenbaum, 329 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 
1964); Poolsman v. Poolsman, supra. The Department's 
duty to provide $1,864.80 in AFDC funds for the 
support of the bankrupt's minor children did not 
arise in a vacuum. 42 U.S.C. §602 (a)(7) requires 
state agencies determining need and eligibility 
for AFDC support to 
11
. . .take into consideration any other 
income and resources of any child or . 
relative claiming aid to families 
with dependent children..." 
Had the bankrupt met his common law and statutory 
support obligation reflected in the divorce court's 
support order, the need of his offspring and the 
level of AFDC payments which the Department was 
obligated to make to those dependents would have 
been correspondingly reduced. See King v. Smith, 
supra, at 319-20, 88 S.Ct. at 2134-35. Therefore, 
the Departments1 payments, while mandated by 
statute and regulations, were substantially in lieu 
of the bankrupt's support obligations. 
The fact that the funds recovered flow to state 
and federal treasuries -^ rather than directly to 
the bankrupt's children does not alter their 
character as obligations for maintenance or support. 
Under RCW 7 4.20A 03 0 the Department is "subrogated" 
to the welfare recipient's right to support. That 
doctrine of subrogation results in a "...shift of 
the original debt from the creditor to the [subrogee] 
who steps into the creditor's shoes." Putnam v. 
Commissioner of Interal Revenue, 3 52 U.S. 82, 85 
77 S.Ct. 175, 176 (1956). E.g., Compania Anonima 
Venezolana de Nav. v. A.J. Perez Exp. Co., 313 F.2d 
692, 696 (5th Cir. 1962); Allen v. See, 196 F.2d 
608, 610 (10th Cir. 1952). As such, the debt to 
the Department is not a debt different than the 
bankrupt's obligation to his dependents although 
it is payable to a different party. 
"k "k "k 
We hold, therefore, that RCW 74.20A 010 et. seq.'s 
recoupment debt is essentially an obligation for 
maintenance or support exempt from discharge in 
bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. §35(a)(7). The 
judgment of the district court requiring 
repayment of $3 97,81 to the bankrupt and 
enjoining further attempts to enforce the 
debt for the balance of the child support 
arrearages outstanding is reversed, and 
the trial court is directed to enter judgment 
in accordance with this opinion.11 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated §55-15-32 states exactly the same 
as the above,in meaning. Though the Williams case, supra, involves 
a direct appeal from the district and bankruptcy courts, the 
question determined is the same as that arising in this instant 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional intent in enacting 42 U.S.C. 656, 
Utah Bankruptcy Court's decision of In re Riley, as well as 
Williams, supra, and Utah's acknowledgment of Federal law in Harmon, 
supra, urge this court to reverse the district court's order and to 
remand for judgment of the proper amount• 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Utah Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
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